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ABSTRACT 
This Comment examines the recently rejected motion to dismiss in League of 
Conservation Voters v. Trump and its potential to serve as a roadmap for 
environmental organizations seeking to challenge regulatory rollbacks by the 
Trump administration. In 2017, President Donald Trump issued an executive 
order reversing the designation of 128 million acres of ocean as protected from 
oil and gas leasing. The League of Conservation Voters, along with other 
environmental activists, sued to enjoin the rollback, and administration 
officials subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. This Comment focuses on the 
issue of Article III standing in the case, wherein the plaintiffs must allege (1) 
an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and (3) 
that a favorable judicial decision will likely redress. Prior to League of 
Conservation Voters, case law had not established injury in fact on the basis of 
potential harm to public lands caused by government deregulation. Thus, the 
ruling that such an injury can be established—even over an area 128 million 
acres in size—reflects an opportunity for environmental activists attempting 
to stop rollbacks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the election of President Donald Trump, environmental 
organizations have often found themselves at odds with environmental 
regulators. In 2015 and 2016, using his authority under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA), President Barack Obama 
withdrew 128 million acres of coastal parts of the Arctic and Atlantic 
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Oceans from oil and gas leasing.1 Shortly after his inauguration, President 
Trump issued Executive Order 13795, reversing President Obama’s prior 
withdrawals.2 One week later, on May 3, 2017, a group of environmental 
organizations, including the League of Conservation Voters, Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Sierra Club, and The Wilderness 
Society, among others, jointly filed suit in the U.S. District Court in 
Alaska, alleging before Judge Sharon Gleason that OCSLA does not give 
the President authority to reverse prior withdrawals.3 
The federal defendants and the intervenors filed motions to dismiss 
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the basis 
of (1) sovereign immunity, (2) the lack of a private right of action, (3) the 
court’s inability to issue declaratory relief against the President, and (4) 
the lack of Article III standing.4 In League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 
the district court dismissed each alleged basis for the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss,5 thereby permitting the litigation to proceed. 
League of Conservation Voters creates a potential blueprint for 
environmental and other organizations to follow as they seek to take their 
fights against administration policies to the courtroom. The case is 
significant for its analysis of Article III standing—particularly for 
showing that litigants suing to protect public lands can satisfy the 
standing requirement for injury in fact—though the additional three 
hurdles the plaintiffs overcame are also important. This Comment will 
first go through the statutory and case history surrounding the 
withdrawal of federal lands from oil and gas leasing, followed by a closer 
look at the district court’s ruling in the case. Subsequently, it will analyze 
the issue of standing in particular, as well as the broader applicability of 
this approach for environmental organizations challenging regulatory 
rollbacks. This Comment will establish that League of Conservation Voters 
acts as a green light for such organizations to move their conflicts with 
the present administration to the courts. 
II. REVERSING FEDERAL LANDS PROTECTIONS AND CHALLENGES 
BY ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS 
OCSLA gives the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for the 
mineral exploration and development of the Outer Continental Shelf 
 
 1.  League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d. 985, 990 (D. 
Alaska 2018). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 991. 
 4.  Id. at 992–93. 
 5.  Id. at 1004. 
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(OCS).6 Under OCSLA, the President “may, from time to time, withdraw 
from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental 
Shelf.”7 OCSLA has been amended several times since 1953; however, 
none of these changes have altered the ultimate mechanisms by which 
land is withdrawn from exploration.8 The statute does not have an explicit 
mechanism for the President to rescind a withdrawal, and no previous 
President has ever attempted a withdrawal.9 This presents two major 
questions with President Trump’s Executive Order: first, whether a 
subsequent President may rescind a Section 12(a) withdrawal; second, 
who has standing to challenge a rollback.10 The present order only 
answers the second question. 
In order to establish standing, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege (1) 
an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and 
(3) that a favorable judicial decision will likely redress.11 To prove an 
injury in fact, plaintiffs must show the harm is imminent, geographically 
specific, and particularized.12 Courts have effectively recognized that 
injury in fact can be established even where the harm is contingent upon 
a series of future actions by third parties.13 However, prior to League of 
Conservation Voters, case law had not established injury in fact on the basis 
of potential harm to public lands caused by government deregulation. 
While it is not novel for plaintiffs to be able to suggest a particularized 
injury, rather than just general harm, as a result of deregulation,14 the case 
 
 6.  43 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). Under OCSLA, the outer continental shelf 
contains all submerged lands within three miles of shore that fall under U.S. 
jurisdiction. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., OCS Lands Act History, 
https://www.boem.gov/OCS-Lands-Act-History/ (last accessed Jan. 30, 2019). 
 7.  43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018). 
 8.  Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., supra note 6. 
 9.  Carol J. Miller, For a Lump of Coal & a Drop of Oil: An Environmentalist’s 
Critique of the Trump Administration’s First-Year Policies, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 185, 212–
13 (2018). 
 10.  Robert T. Anderson, Protecting Offshore Drilling Areas from Oil and Gas 
Leasing: Presidential Authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and 
Antiquities Act, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 727, 763–64. Anderson goes on to argue that 
because the Section 12(a) revocation was issued “without expiration,” it is up to 
Congress alone to provide otherwise. Id. at 764. 
 11.  League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d. 985, 995–96 (D. 
Alaska 2018). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000 (1982) (finding established injury 
in fact despite reliance on uncertain future third-party acts). 
 14.  In Alaska Wildlife All. v. Jensen, the Ninth Circuit held that there is 
sufficient particular harm for standing when “noise, trash, and wakes of vessels” 
diminish plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the land. 108 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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ventures into new territory with respect to the geographic scope of the 
claimed injury—covering 128 million acres of ocean.15 
The ruling in League of Conservation Voters has already served as a 
guide elsewhere in the world of environmental litigation. The NRDC 
relied on it as a basis for establishing injury in fact in its brief opposing 
the government’s motion to dismiss in Hopi Tribe v. Trump,16 a suit 
challenging the Trump administration’s decision to make 1.15 million 
acres of Bears Ears National Monument available to mining interests.17 
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump also offers implications for standing 
in cases like a suit brought by Our Children’s Trust, filed on behalf of a 
group of children challenging government inaction in combatting climate 
change.18 The ongoing litigation offers further opportunity to flesh out 
what these challenges to litigation may look like—as long as they can get 
over initial hurdles to dismiss. 
III. THE LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS BRINGS SUIT 
On April 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13795, 
rescinding the previous withdrawal of 128 million acres of the continental 
shelf from offshore exploration.19 The next day, the Secretary of the 
Interior issued an order, which called in part for the expedited 
consideration of seismic permitting applications.20 These applications 
permitted the use of loud sound pulses to identify potential oil and gas 
deposits—pulses which several environmental organizations, including 
the League of Conservation Voters, claimed would harm and potentially 
kill various fish and marine mammals.21 The environmental activists 
brought suit on May 3, 2017, alleging that the action both exceeded the 
President’s Article II powers22 and was ultra vires as OCSLA does not 
 
 15.  Plaintiffs, in their brief opposing the motion to dismiss, cited Lujan v. Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 899 (1990), which offered a similar claim to protect a 
large tract of federal land, but even then it was on a much smaller scale, in the 
thousands of acres. 
 16.  NRDC Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 
4, Hopi Tribe v. Trump (D.D.C. 2018) (Nos. 17-cv-2590 (TSC), 17-cv-2605 (TSC), 
17-cv-2606 (TSC)), 2018 WL 6112218. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018). 
 19.  League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985, 990 (D. 
Alaska 2018). 
 20.  Id. at 991. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. The complaint alleges that the action intrudes upon Congress’s non-
delegated exclusive power under the Property Clause in violation of the 
separation of powers. Id. 
36.1 BUCHTA-JORGENSEN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  1:58 PM 
2019 LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS 113 
authorize the President to reverse a prior withdrawal.23 The suit named 
President Trump, then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke, and Secretary 
of Commerce Wilbur Ross as defendants, with the American Petroleum 
Institute and State of Alaska permitted to join as intervenors.24 
In the present opinion, the district court considered dismissal on the 
basis of (1) sovereign immunity, (2) the lack of a private right of action, 
(3) the inability of the court to issue declaratory relief against the 
President, and (4) a lack of Article III standing.25 
The court quickly dispensed with the first three arguments.26 With 
respect to sovereign immunity, the court noted the present case fits neatly 
into the exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine where an officer 
makes an allegedly unconstitutional act in the sovereign’s name.27 It 
explained that a statutory grant of a private right of action is unnecessary 
because the plaintiffs are not suing to enforce federal law, but rather to 
challenge the President for allegedly exceeding his constitutional 
authority.28 The court largely sidestepped the issue of declaratory 
judgment, noting that, should the plaintiffs win, an injunction against 
subordinate officials should be sufficient, thereby obviating the problems 
with issuing a declaratory judgment against the President.29 
The court spent more time on Article III standing, which requires the 
plaintiffs to allege (1) an injury in fact that is (2) fairly traceable to the 
challenged conduct and (3) that a favorable judicial decision will likely 
redress.30 To prove an injury in fact, plaintiffs must show the harm is 
imminent, geographically specific, and particularized.31 For the purposes 
of a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficient standing, as seen here, 
the issue is simply whether the general facts alleged are enough to 
support the claim, not whether the harm itself has actually occurred.32 The 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. Zinke was named because the U.S. Department of the Interior 
administers OCSLA, while the U.S. Department of Commerce implements the 
Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act. Id. 
 25.  Id. at 993. These were based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), 
arguing that the complaint is facially insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction and 
placing an affirmative burden on the plaintiffs to establish Article III standing. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiffs must also be able to show a claim to relief 
that is facially plausible, with more than the “sheer possibility that a defendant 
has acted unlawfully.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
 26.  303 F. Supp. 3d at 993–95. 
 27.  Id. at 993. This is one of two exceptions the Court has laid out, in addition 
to when an officer acts beyond the scope of his statutorily limited powers. Larson 
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–91 (1994). 
 28.  303 F. Supp. 3d at 994. 
 29.  Id. at 995. 
 30.  Id. at 995–96. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
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court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs could demonstrate injury in 
fact and so possessed Article III standing.33 
First, the district court held that the plaintiffs could show sufficiently 
imminent harm.34 The primary barrier to standing for a group like the 
present plaintiffs—suing to protect lands over which they have no claim 
of ownership—is that their actual harm is too causally attenuated to 
establish injury in fact.35 Here, the district court found that the harm 
mirrored that of In re Zappos.com, Inc.36 In that case, the Ninth Circuit 
found standing because though harm had not yet occurred, the risk of 
harm did not depend on a chain of speculative inferences; rather, the risk 
was imminent because the hackers who stole the data had the ability to 
harmfully misuse it.37 From this, the district court concluded that the 
League of Conservation Voters plaintiffs had established sufficiently 
imminent harm through allegations that the Executive Order expedited 
energy production and that drilling had already begun in the previously 
withdrawn areas.38 
Next, in determining whether the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient 
“geographic specificity,” the court focused on Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Kempthorne.39 In Kempthorne, the Ninth Circuit held that “the 
degree of geographic specificity required depends on the size of the area 
that is impacted by the government’s action.”40 Notably, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the plaintiff’s identification of the region as “the Beaufort Sea 
region” was sufficient.41 Here, despite covering 128 million acres of ocean, 
the district court also found that the injury was sufficiently 
geographically specific.42 The court explained that because the area in 
question is discrete and defined, the size of it does not ultimately present 
an issue.43 It concluded that this was sufficient when coupled with the 
plaintiffs’ statements that they visit and use the Atlantic Ocean and 
adjacent areas.44 
This left the court with the question of particularized harm. In order 
to satisfy this requirement, plaintiffs must show the injury affects them in 
 
 33.  Id. at 1001. 
 34.  Id. at 999. 
 35.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (finding 
insufficient standing for U.S. citizens to challenge the Foreign Intelligence Services 
Act because it required a “multi-link chain of inferences”). 
 36.  303 F. Supp. 3d at 997. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 997–98. 
 39.  303 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000 (citing 588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 40.  588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 41.  Id. at 707–08. 
 42.  League of Conservation Voters, 303 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
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a personalized, individual way—the injury must actually be to the 
individual, not just the environment.45 The court determined that this 
threshold was also met, on the ground that the drilling would allegedly 
cause the animals pain and suffering, which would interfere with the 
plaintiffs’ “use and enjoyment of the areas and associated wildlife.”46 
Taken collectively, the district court rejected the notion that the 
plaintiffs had failed to meet the requirements for Article III standing and 
the motions to dismiss were denied.47 
Having overcome the motions to dismiss, the litigation remains 
ongoing and it is being followed closely by environmental activists.48 
Although the present ruling did not garner much attention outside these 
circles, the case as a whole will ultimately be of vital interest both inside 
and outside of the administration. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING ESTABLISHED STANDING 
On March 29, 2019, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, 
holding that the executive order exceeded the president’s authority.49  The 
administration is widely expected to appeal the decision to the Ninth 
Circuit.50 Although the underlying suit in League of Conservation Voters has 
not yet been resolved and the full implications of the present ruling are as 
yet unclear, this decision may show other regulation challengers how to 
survive the crucial test of establishing injury in fact for Article III 
standing. In effect, it could provide a structural framework for 
environmental groups to generate suits challenging regulatory rollbacks. 
While it did not alter the test, it does show private parties how to satisfy 
the requirements that the injury be (1) sufficiently imminent, (2) 
geographically specific, and (3) particularized.51 
To survive a motion to dismiss where standing is challenged, the 
party bringing the suit bears the burden of proof, as he would for any 
other essential element of his claims, including the three requirements for 
injury in fact.52 General factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 1001. 
 47.  Id. at 1001, 1004. 
 48.  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9; Anderson, supra note 10. 
   49. League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG, 2019 WL 
1431217 at *13 (D. Alaska Mar. 29, 2019). 
   50.  Kevin Bohn, Judge rules Trump executive order allowing offshore drilling in 
Arctic Ocean unlawful, CNN (Mar. 30, 2019, 7:16 PM), available at 
www.cnn.com/2019/03/30/politics/trump-offshore-drilling-arctic/index.html. 
 51.  League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d. 985, 1004 (D. 
Alaska 2018). 
 52.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
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defendant’s conduct will suffice on a motion to dismiss because the court 
will presume that the general allegations contain the specific facts 
necessary to support the claim.53 This puts the plaintiff at an advantage at 
the pleading stage. 
While analyzing the “imminent harm” issue, the district court saw 
the facts of this case as sitting somewhere between Zappos,54 where the 
court held that the plaintiffs had sufficient risk of future harm to sue 
defendants after alleging that hackers had stolen their personal 
information from them, and Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,55 where the 
Court held that the chance of the plaintiffs being incidentally surveilled 
was not enough to challenge an act authorizing surveillance of foreign 
persons.56 In League of Conservation Voters, the court used the following 
evidence to find the complaint adequately alleged imminent harm: (1) the 
stated purpose of the President’s Executive Order,57 (2) the oil industry’s 
interest in drilling in the previously withdrawn regions,58 (3) the federal 
government’s previous actions regarding oil and gas leases in the Arctic 
and Atlantic Oceans under OCSLA,59 (4) the fact that seismic surveys 
precede oil and gas lease sales,60 and (5) that seismic surveys harm 
wildlife.61 
The court found that this evidence created a short enough causal 
chain to establish that the alleged harm from seismic surveying was 
sufficiently imminent for Article III standing.62 In determining that the 
evidence was closer to Zappos than Clapper, the court may have widened 
the scope of what constitutes “imminent harm.”63 By likening the 
somewhat uncertain risk of harm from companies surveying for gas and 
oil when they do not yet have approval64 to the more concrete risk of harm 
in Zappos, where wrongdoers actually had the plaintiff’s personal data in 
 
 53.  303 F. Supp. 3d. at 996 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (1992)). 
 54.  In re Zappos.com, Inc., 884 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 55.  568 U.S. 398 (2013) (holding that the plaintiff’s speculative chain of 
possibilities did not establish an impending harm). 
 56.  303 F. Supp. 3d. at 997. 
 57.  Id. at 997–98. 
 58.  Id. at 998. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 999. 
 61.  Id. at 998. 
 62.  Id. at 999. 
 63.  Id. at 997. 
 64.  Id. at 998–99 (“[C]ompanies also have sought approval to conduct seismic 
surveys even when lease sales are more than four years away and [are] 
not included in an existing or proposed five-year program.”) (quoting Complaint 
at 17–18, League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 3:17CV00101 (D. Alaska 
Mar. 3, 2017)). 
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hand, the court moved the line for imminent harm further in favor of 
future plaintiffs. 
Next, the court found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient 
“geographic specificity” even though the area of the alleged conduct was 
128 million acres.65 While the area of concern is larger than that in 
Kempthorne, the court noted that “it is discrete and defined.”66 If this case 
proves an appropriate guide, future litigants should be very clear on the 
regions in question to survive a motion to dismiss. Notably, this is not the 
largest area of harm to survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment. 
The plaintiffs in Juliana alleged global harm and survived.67 League of 
Conservation Voters coupled with Juliana puts into question whether an 
area can ever be too large for standing purposes as long as it is defined 
with sufficient specificity.68 
Finally, the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs 
experienced personal and particularized harm to an interest in the 
defined area rather than mere generalized harm to the environment.69 
Particularized harm “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way.”70 Such harm can be towards mere aesthetic and recreational values 
that are lessened by the challenged activity.71 
Here, the plaintiffs alleged harm was to their “interest in visiting, 
using, inhabiting, studying, and recreating in—or viewing wildlife that 
depends on—areas affected by [the challenged activity].”72 This was 
found to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement for “particularized 
harm.”73 Of the three elements of injury in fact, the court’s interpretation 
of this third element changes the least, as it was already broad enough to 
include aesthetic or recreational interests.74 The court did not take into 
account whether the afflicted area is actively in use, nor does the size of 
the area seem to do any work for whether the injury is “personal.” If this 
case stands, so long as environmental groups can show that they have 
enjoyed the aesthetics of an area in the past, they should be able to show 
particularized harm if it is affected by government action. 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 1000. 
 67.  Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1089–90 (D. Or. 2018). 
 68.  See supra note 15 and accompanying discussion. 
 69.  Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 707, (9th Cir. 
2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
 70.  303 F. Supp. 3d. at 1000 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
1548 (2016)). 
 71.  Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 
U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
League of Conservation Voters offers a potential roadmap for future 
challenges to regulatory rollbacks, at least in their initial stages. The early 
challenge for similar suits is to satisfy the elements of standing in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss. League of Conservation Voters provides a 
framework for overcoming that obstacle. Most notably, its understanding 
of “imminent harm” allows for a longer causal chain and “geographic 
specificity” imposes no limit on the size of an area in controversy, so long 
as that area is discrete and defined. Though helpful, this ruling’s value is 
limited for now, as the district court has yet to rule on the litigation’s 
substantive issues. Nonetheless, this case represents a critical step for 
groups hoping to enjoin deregulation of public lands. It will be 
increasingly vital as groups such as Our Children’s Trust75 explore 
avenues to establish standing in suits challenging the federal government 
on climate change. Framing the issues in the same ways as the League of 
Conservation Voters provides such similar organizations with more tools 
to make sure they get their day in court. 
 
 
 75.  In 2015, a group of children filed suit in U.S. District Court, and the suit 
has moved throughout the courts in the pre-trial phase ever since, most recently 
with the Ninth Circuit issuing a temporary stay on trial proceedings. Order at 3, 
Juliana v. United States, No. 18-80176 (9th Cir. 2018), https://static1.square 
space.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/5c2432b140ec9a0be72fddc5/154
5876145804/DktEntry+8-1+Order+granting+appeal.pdf. 
